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ABSTRACT
Figure 1. ARES J andARES V Launch Vehicles in
Comparison
The United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space
exploration program intended for sending crew and
cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the
moon, and beyond. This program is called
Constellation. As part of the Constellation program,
NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at
significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the
cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for
manned space exploration. Achieving these goals
requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability,
safety, ,md cost upfront and throughout all the phases of
the life cycle of the program.
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This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and
Safety" approach for the NASA new launch vehicles,
the ARES I and ARES V. Specifically, the paper
addresses the use of an integrated probabilistic
functional analysis to support the design analysis cycle
and a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to support the
preliminary design and beyond.
1.0 BACKGROUND
The ARES I, shown in Fig. 2, consists of three major
Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage
(US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). The CEV
it delivers to orbit consists of a Launch Abort System
(LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and
a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is
being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).
This section provides some background on the new
NASA launch vehicles, and an overview of some of
NASA applications of probabilistic methods in recent
years.
1.1 NASA New Launch Vehicles
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of
the NASA new launch vehicles, ARES I and ARES V.
Fig. I shows the two vehicles in comparison with
themselves and heritage vehicles. The arrows indicate
hardware commonality.
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The intended purpose of the ARES I, developed by
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), is to
safely deliver a payload of crew and cargo to a specified
ascent target. This capability will support two separate
missions: to carry the payloads to the International
Space Station (ISS); and to deliver a Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV) with crew to dock with a Lunar Surface
Ascent Module (LSAM) and Earth Departure Stage
(EDS) in Earth orbit for a lunar mission.
Figure 2. ARES J Expanded View
The intended purpose of the ARES V launch vehicle,
also developed by MSFC, is currently to deliver the
LSAM for lunar missions, to deliver cargo to orbit, and
to potentially deliver a single-launch solution to the
Moon with combined CEV and lunar lander payloads.
As shown in Fig. 3, the ARES V consists of the
following: a liquid Core Stage with 5 RS-68 engines
augmented by 2 five-segment Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motors (RSRMs); an Interstage; an EDS with payload
(LSAM shown); and Shroud.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070031700 2019-08-30T01:37:46+00:00Z
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Figure 3. ARES V Expanded View
1.2 Overview of NASA Applications of Probabilistic
Me-thods
Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986,
NASA has begun incorporating Quantitative risk
assessments (QRA) in decisions concerning the Space
Shuttle and other NASA projects. At MSFC, for
example, QRA has been extensively used in areas such
as risk management of fljght hardware, trade studies,
and reliability prediction of new hardware. In the risk
management area, life limits based on QRA are being
used in the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) program
[1]. QRA has also been incorporated to support flight
issues on the SSME as well as other MSFC elements.
With regard to trade studies, QRA has been used as the
basis to evaluate the elimination of unnecessary
inspections, procedures, and other program costs. For
example, an extensive study was conducted in 1994 to
determine whether to eliminate the pre-proof test x-ray
inspections on the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET)
[2]. In the reliability prediction area, similarity analysis
and probabilistic structural models have been used by
MSFC to predict the reliability of Alternate Turbo
Pumps (ATD) for the SSME, the X-33 Engine, and
other engines [3, 4, and 5].
At the system level, NASA Headquarters has led several
studies to predict the overall Space Shuttle risk. The
first of these Space Shuttle QRA studies was conducted
in 1988 by Planning Research Corporation (pRC). Per
NASA's request, PRC conducted a QRA study to
determine the Space Shuttle risk for the Galileo mission
[6]. In 1993, Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) updated the Galileo study using
Bayesian techniques [7]. In 1995, SAIC conducted a
comprehensive QRA study [8]. In July 1996, the NASA
Administrator requested an independent QRA to be
conducted by NASA QRA experts. In response to the
Administrator's request, ASA conducted a two year
study (October 1996 - September 1998) to develop a
model that provided an overall Space Shuttle risk and
estimates of risk changes due to proposed Shuttle
upgrades [9]. Finally, building on previous Shuttle risk
assessment studies, JSC has recently completed an
extensive study of the Space Shuttle risks. This study
have not yet officially been released.
After the Columbia accident, NASA conducted a QRA
on ET foam. This study was the most focused and most
extensive risk assessment that NASA has conducted in
recent years. It used a dynamic, physics based,
integrated system analysis approach to understand the
integrated system risk due to ET foam loss in flight
[10].
Unfortunately, a lot ofNASA probabilistic analyses in
the past have been done after the fact (operational
Shuttle system). This paper describes NASA application
of probabilistic analysis methods starting at the design
phase. Specifically, the paper addresses the use of an
integrated probabilistic functional analysis upfront to
support the system Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) and a
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to support the
preliminary design and beyond.
2.0 THE "DESIGN FOR RELIABILITY AND
SAFETY APPROACH"
The "Design for Reliability and Safety" discussions in
this paper is focused on ARES I launch vehicle.
However, the same approach is applicable to the ARES
V launch vehicle.
Before getting into the discussion of the subject of this
paper, it important note the Constellation Program has
in place ambitious quantitative requirements for Loss of
Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC. The LOM and
LOC (or equivalents) have been allocated to the ARES I
and its major elements, the First Stage (FS), the Upper
Stage (US), and the Upper Stage Engine (USE).
Satisfying these requirements constitute an ambitious
goal that forced a paradigm shift at NASA. This
paradigm shift has set the stage for establishing a
working environment that integrates various disciplines
(safety, reliability, design, etc.) and various
organizations (Engineering design organizations, project
office, and safety and mission assurance organisation) to
support the design process. Within this integrated
environment, this paradigm shift has also set the stage
for a new era at ASA in applying a sound probabilistic
design approach, to analyze, understand, and influence
the design upfront and throughout the different phases
of the design. This paper focuses on the probabilistic
design approach, and more specifically, on the use of
the various quantitative probabilistic approaches that
have been pursued by the ARES I project.
Section 2.1. discusses an integrated functional
probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upfront
some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis
Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This
functional approach is a probabilistic physics based
approach that combines failure probabilities with system
dynamics and engineering failure impact models to
identify key system risk drivers and potential system
design requirements. Section 2.2 discusses other
probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the
ARES ] project to support the PD phase and beyond.
2.1 The Probabilistic Functional Failure Analysis
(pFFA) Approach
The PFFA approach is a dynamic top-down scenario-
based approach intended to identify, model, and
understand high system risk drivers for the purpose of
influencing both system design and system
requirements. This approach is implemented upfront
during the system DAC phase preceding the preliminary
design review (PDR). The current focus for the ARES I
PFFA i- on energetic or dynamic events and significant
changes of state for the launch vehicle that can lead to
LOM or LOC. Failures not initiated by the launch
vehicle, other than those induced by the natural
environment, and launch vehicle software failures were
not currently considered. The launch vehicle was
assumed to be fully tested and qualified with all tests
and ve 'fication complete.
The first step in a PFFA is to define the miSSIOn
timeline of system level functions. The applicable
ARES I mission timeline includes the pre-launch and
ascent hases. The system level functions during the
phases include fuel load, crew load, pre-start, launch,
staging (FS separation and USE start), LAS jettison,
Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), and orbit insertion
(payload separation) with CEV separation from the
Upper Stage. Fig. 4 shows the ARES I ISS ascent
mission proftle including elapsed times.
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Figure 4. Example ISS Mission Profile
Given the mission timeline of system level functions,
the nex1 step in a PFFA is to identify for each system
level function the lower-level functions to a selected
level of indenture. These lower-level functions are then
transformed into a failure structure by restating each as
functional failure or failure event. Next, the functional
failures are analyzed for their effects on the applicable
physical design. The resulting failure effects, labeled as
hazards or undesired conditions, are grouped by
commonality of their effect on element (e.g., Upper
Stage) or launch vehicle. These groupings are labeled
as failure bins which are listed for further analysis. Tab.
1 is an example of such a failure bin for the uncontained
(energetic failure with hazardous physical effects
crossing beyond the source boundary) failure of the
Upper Stage Engine.
Table 1. Example ofa Binfor Upper Stage Engine
Uncontained Failure
Failure Events or Hazard or Undesired
Scenarios Condition
MFV fails to open Ox-rich combustion in
MCC. LOC
Insufficient purge at Trapped propellants
igniter on ignite/explode
Insufficient purge at Trapped propellants
igniter on ignite/explode
Excessive gas spin flow Excess propellant flow to
engine. Overpressure in
MCC/GG. Ifnot detected,
rupture and LOC
GGFV fails to open Lox-rich combustion in
GG. Fire/explosion. LOC
Excessive gimbaling Structural Damage
during engine start
Engine Hardware failure Fire/explosion
MCC/Nozzle bumthrough Hot gas impingement on
engine. LOC
Nozzle extension Side thrust. IfTVC
burnthrough unable to correct for thrust
enough to give time for
crew abort, LOC.
Otherwise LOM
Seal failure Hot gas impingement on
engine. LOC
MCC/GG overpressure Continued MCC
data not relayed to/from overpressure results in
engine rupture. LOC
Insufficient propellant Engine cavitation leading
(NPSP) from US to engine to uncontained failure
(either L02 or LH2) LOC.
Insufficient propellant Engine turbopumps could
quality/volume (gas) from overspeed
US to engine
Insufficient propellant Engine cavitation
(NPSP) from US to engine
Figure 6. Failure Environment Development Example
ascent and launch vehicle parameters, and LAS
activation time.
Fig. 7 illustrates the combined failure timeline from
initiator to critical overpressure for the example
scenario along with a crew escape timeline. The crew
escape timeline is superimposed upon the failure
timeline to model the effectiveness of abort capability
against the particular hazard to crew. The escape
timeline involves the response and abort capability of
the LAS and CEV. It includes detection of the hazard,
activation of the LAS, and subsequent CEV separation
to a safe position.
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Fig. 5 shows a representation of the path and off-
nominal time from the failure event, labeled "initiator",
to the physical failure mode of rupture, labeled "fault",
to the local failure effects, labeled "threat/hazardous
environment", from which the crew must escape. Each
failure event or initiator is assumed to cause an
immediate loss of mission and a decision to perform an
abort.
Given the "bounding" failure scenarios, a short list (a
handful of scenarios) is established based on project
priorities for further in-depth focused analysis.
Specifically, the items on the short list are subjected to
in-depth physics based dynamic simulation modeling to
understand the physics of failure, the probability of
launch vehicle failure or break up, and the launch abort
system capability to save the crew. Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and
Fig. 7 represent an end-to-end example of the logic of
the components of the in-depth focused analysis for an
item that could potentially be part of the short list for
ARESl.
Given the list of failure bins, the next step in a PFFA is
to detennine the "bounding" failure scenario for each
bin. The "bounding" failure scenario is selected based
on the frequency of occurrence, the impact on system
risk, and the potential for design improvement.
Figure 5. Failure Event to Initial Failure Environment
Example
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While the PFFA described in section 2.1 serves the
purpose of impacting the design during the system
DAC, a classical PRA is performed subsequently to
support the preliminary design, detailed design and
beyond. The PRA would be structured and focused by
the results of the PFFA. The following section discusses
the classical PRA process that will be used in
To summarize, the process just described in the example
(Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7) starts with a failure initiators,
followed by propagations of the failure initiator to a
system failure, and then the impact of the system failure
on the LOC. This all done taking into consideration the
system dynamics at the time of the failure initiation and
the physics of the failure as the failure propagates
through the system all the way to the impact of the
failure on the effectiveness of the abort system.
Figure 7. Failure and Crew Escape Timeline
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Fig. 6 shows an example of the failure logic for an
explosion resulting from the energetic event of an USE
uncontained start failure as seen in the previous figure.
Hazards to other launch vehicle elements from an
explosion include overpressure, fragmentation, and fire.
Physics-based simulation models will be developed for
each hazard to crew survivability as applicable. For
example, the model for overpressure risk to crew will
involve a blast model that makes use of the equivalent
TNT yield of the liquid propellant, launch vehicle
trajectory and flight environment data, physical
parameters of the LAS and crew module, other critical
conjunction with the PFFA to support post DAC design
phases.
2.2. The PRA Process
PRA is a rigorous method to model what can go wrong
with a system, predict how often it might go wrong (the
probability that specific undesired events will occur),
identify the consequences if something does go wrong,
and, engage the design and development community to
the fullest extent. Within NASA the PRA uses as input,
among others, the safety, reliability, and even quality
models and analyses. These would include hazard
analyses, fault tree analyses, failure modes and effects
analyses, reliability predictions, and process
characterization and control analyses. PRA provides
information on the uncertainty of the predictions and
identifies which failures and, therefore, which systems,
subsystems, and components, pose the most significant
risk to the system. The following is a description of the
PRA process as defined by NPR 8705.5, Probabilistic
Risk Assessments (PRA) Procedures for NASA
Programs and Projects.
Fig. 8 shows a generic PRA process. The master logic
diagram (MLD) is a hierarchical, top-down display of
initiating events (IE), showing general types of
undesired events at the top, proceeding to increasingly
detailed event descriptions at lower tiers, and displaying
initiating events at the bottom. The modeling of each
accident scenario proceeds with inductive logic tools
called event sequence diagrams (ESDs). An ESD starts
with the initiating event and progresses through the
scenario, a series of successes or failures of intermediate
events called pivotal events, until an end state is
reached. ESDs are mapped into event trees (ETs),
which relate more directly to practical quantification of
accident scenarios, but the ESD representation has the
significant advantage over the ETs of enhancing
communication between risk engineers, designers, and
crews. Upon completion of the event trees, Fault Trees
(FTs) are created to model how failures and other events
combine to cause failures of pivotal events
(intermediate events) in the accident scenario. The
pivotal events are placed at the tops of the FTs and
deductive logic is used to identify the combination of
events that may result in the top event-Le., to develop
the branches of the fault trees. The fault trees may
consist of: the top event (pivotal event), intermediate
events or logic gates, and the basic events. The basic
events are linked to the top event through the
intermediate logic gates. The fault trees are simplified
through Boolean reduction to quantify each pivotal
event in the scenario. The accident sequences (event
sequences) and FTs are logically linked and quantified,
usually using an integrated PRA computer program.
The frequency of occurrence of each end state in the ET
is calculated as the product of the IE frequency and the
(conditional) probabilities of the pivotal events along
the scenario path linking the IE to the end state.
Scenarios are grouped according to the end state of the
scenario defining the consequence. All end states are
then grouped, i.e., their frequencies are summed up into
the frequency of a representative end state. As part of
the quantification, uncertainty analyses are performed to
evaluate the degree of knowledge or confidence in the
calculated numerical risk results. [11]
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Figure 8. PRA Process
2.2.2 PFFA and PRA in support of the Design
process
As discussed in section 2.1, the intent of the PFFA is to
analyze and understand a set of integrated system failure
scenarios that have the major impact on system risk.
The analysis results are then used for potential design
changes, abort requirements changes, fault detection
improvements, and possibly design changes to reduces
or eliminate the probability of the failure initiator. The
analysis in a PFFA is dynamic in nature. It takes into
consideration the dynamic of the failure sequence as a
function of time, and the dynamics of the system
environment. On the other hand, the PRA described in
the above section is, generally, static in nature. While
the PFFA serves the purpose of impacting the design
during the system DAC, a classical PRA is performed
subsequently to support the preliminary design, detailed
design and beyond. The PRA would be structured and
focused by the results of the PFFA. Specifically, the
PFFA work results in the event sequence diagrams and
possibly the initial event trees and branch point
quantification that would be part of the PRA. These
models would then be supplemented by detailed fault
tree models and supporting data analyses, as required, in
the areas that have been shown in the PFFA as the
potential risk drivers.
3.0 CONCLUSION
The authors of this paper tried to describe a changing
environment at NASA set by a paradigm shift on how
NASA is planning to use probabilistic assessment
methods to support the design process for its new
launch vehicles. The PFFA discussed in the paper
represents a critical first step for the implementation of
a "design for Reliability and Safety" approach needed
for achieving the NASA ambitious goals in designing a
highly reliable and safe launch vehicles.
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